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Our purpose in this paper is the explication of the way we have come to 
view the accomplishment of spoken discourse. More immediately, we describe 
the discourse sources of certain distinctions that we have found necessary in the 
description of lexological order in the German Satzfeld (Copeland and Davis 
Ms.). The theoretical model that serves as orienting framework for that work 
and also for this paper is that of Lamb's stratificational grammar, now known 
as cognitive linguistics. The initial appeal of the model is that it permits one to 
consider the language phenomena of content, i.e., semantics in its many inter- 
pretations, without immediately embroiling oneself in expression, i.e., syntax, 
morphology, and phonology; and it is that independence that is the base of our 
comments here. 
It is, of course, impossible to prove any view of discourse to be correct, and 
we will be satisfied here if ours provides an intuitively reasonable characteriza- 
tion of that process. What we mean by "intuitively reasonable" is that the model 
should provide a place for discourse elements and, additionally, that it should 
be approximately congruent with the results of other approaches to those 
phenomena, e.g., cognitive psychology.' Even with this diluted goal, we shall 
be able only to outline a general framework and provide some indication of 
how it might function. 
In "Discourse Portmanteaus" (Copeland and Davis Ms.) we found it 
necessary to distinguish between components of a sentence that were-in 
terms of the discourse-Given, Recoverable, or New. Motivation for at least 
these distinctions lay in the way event-participant elements are ordered within 
the German ~atzfeld.' Our concern here is not with the evidence for these 
terms but with how they are represented on strata higher than the lexo1ogical. 
Semologically, these three reveal themselves to  be partially alike, and this 
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partial similarity results in their being treated as portmanteaus of more 
"elemental" terms. 
A now standard characterization of semotactics is its identification as that 
portion of language that accounts for the linguistic expression of the con- 
ceptualization of happenings; that is, things happen, states exist, identifications 
occur, and this information is transmitted from one speaker to another. The 
description of the conceptualization of possible occurrence is the domain of 
semotactics. Propositions, the semotactic manifestation of occurrence, have 
been viewed as consisting of some event proper and one or more participant 
roles. Such a view is to be found in much recent work, e.g., Fillmore (1968 
and 197 I) ,  Chafe (1 970), and Lockwood ( 1  972). A detailed examination of 
semotactic events-their classification and identification as Static, Active, 
Mutative, etc,-and semotactic roles-Agent, Patient, Beneficiary, etc.-and 
any further parameters the language may recognize in categorizing events, e.g., 
Control (see Thompson 1979), may constitute a semotactic description of the 
proposition. Yet this fails to include all the possible information an utterance 
may convey. Utterances do not occur in isolation-ever. And their place in 
some context, verbal and/or  non-verbal, is generally what we intend by 
discour~e.~ The information an utterance conveys pertaining to its place 
among other utterances and the information conveyed by the semotactic 
structure, together, still fail to  exhaust the possible content of an utterance. 
Such grammatical categories as non-indicative mood, choice among values 
of some linguistic variable (Labov 1972), or simply the fact of dialect 
(Hjelmslev's "linguistic physiognomy") illustrate the kinds of information 
that may be contained within an utterance in addition to propositional and 
discourse information. We believe these latter types may be heuristically 
separated from propositional and discourse meanings, and we shall set them 
aside. 
Discourse information of an utterance is sensitive to the knowledge those 
who are conversing have accumulated prior to the time of speech. Proposi- 
tional configurations then adapt themselves to and reflect that ever-changing 
statelcondition of a discourse. Some aspects of the current state of discourse 
are these: The speaker makes an evaluation of what his interlocutor is thinking 
of, and this judgment will be influenced by what the verbal and non-verbal 
context is. If the two are sitting on a park bench at midday facing a busy street 
and a squirrel starts across in front of a car, the speaker may assume his com- 
panion to be aware of the same non-verbal, visual context and say: 
(1) The squirrel's not going to make it. 
The choice of the as opposed, say, to a orsomeconveys information about the 
context the speaker and addressee share-here, a non-verbal context. The 
speaker assumes the addressee to  be conscious of the participant-squirrel and 
able to identify the particular one in question. This context-derived informa- 
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tion is what we summarize as Given. Now, if the two are strolling home at 
sundown and one comments to the other, 
(2) I didn't think the squirrel was going to make it 
again the choice the is possible. Yet, the context is now such that the speaker 
may have no reason to assume his interlocutor continues to be conscious of or 
thinking of the squirrel, but the is still an appropriate choice. The context 
signaled here by the is that the addressee is assumed to be able to  recall and 
identify a particular squirrel. Here, 'squirrel' may be said to be Recoverable. 
The difference between the contexts of (1) and (2) is distinguishable in that 
the context of (1) also makes it possible to say 
(3) He's not going to make it 
whereas in the context of (2), 
(4) I didn't think he was going to make it 
may sound "out of the blue" unless the phrase going to make it enables the 
addressee to identify the referent of he. For example, the addition of across 
the street to (4) may be sufficient to allow the addressee to identify what the 
speaker has in mind (if the repetition of make it has not sufficed). Thus,   he 
squirrel and h e .  . . across the street may both signal a Recoverable participant; 
and Recoverable does not necessarily have a single linguistic expression. 
Nevertheless, the he of (4) places a greater burden on the addressee than (2); it 
is less cooperative in the quantity of information necessary to achieve under- 
standing (Grice 1975). Where the verbaI and non-verbal context give the 
speaker no reason to conclude that his addressee can identify the particular 
one, this may be indicated by the choice a rather than the: 
(5) A dog just ran off with your lunch. 
Participants of this ilk will be called New. 
The introduction of Given, Recoverable, and New has here been in terms 
of particulars: unique individuals or representatives; the squirrel in ( I )  is 
contextually unique within its discourse, but not all conversations pertain to 
uniques or particulars. Occasionally, a participant may be a class without 
regard to its instantiation, 
(6) The squirrel is an odd animal 
or the instantiation of the class may be completely or not at all determined: 
(7) Any squirrel will do for our stew. 
We call participants such as those in (6) and (7) Generic and Some, respectively. 
The semantic closeness between these distinctions and the previous three is 
reflected by the neutralization that exists; the functions as a realization of both 
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Given and Generic, and a marks both New and Some. See also the discussion 
of (8) below. Our immediate argument will proceed using the terms of Given- 
Recoverable-New, and we will return below to  comment upon Generic and 
Some within the framework we shall derive in the course of the paper. 
The contextual information conveyed by the choice between the and a 
(and other choices) does not exhaust the relevant contextual, discourse in- 
formation expressed by an  utterance, and the remaining discriminations are 
more difficult to  identify correctly. We may consider two sentences; first, 
sentence (5) above and (8): 
(8) It was your lunch a dog just ran off with. 
Both might be appropriate to  describe the same token happening. They differ 
not in the propositional information conveyed but with respect to the context, 
that is, how the speaker assesses the addressee's consciousness and knowledge 
of the circumstance at that moment. The utterance of (8) is more constrained in 
this respect. The addressee's attention at the moment of utterance must be 
focused on the participant-role of possible things a dog may run off with, and 
he must be conscious of certain aspects of the propositional content of the 
utterance of (8). Notice, for example, that a in (8) must mark Some; since 
consciousness of certain elements of the event is necessarily signaled by 
such sentences, a cannot possibly indicate New here, and Some is its only 
possible alternative content. Sentence (5) is, by contrast, less constrained; it 
may come out of the blue, presupposing no particular focus ofconsciousness. 
The point of the comparison of (5) and (8) is this: The difference between them 
is a function of context and hence is a discourse one; and second, the parameters 
of this difference are distinct from the discourse information identified with 
Given, Recoverable, and New that we have described as varying from partici- 
pant to participant. The contextual, informationaI differential of (5) versus (8) 
is a specific exemplification of a more general phenomenon, i.e., telling the 
addressee what the speaker assumes he didn't know, the traditional Theme- 
Rheme distinction. 
Although the Theme-Rheme opposition is sometimes labeled Given-New 
(Chafe 1974; Clark and Haviland 1977), it is convenient to distinguish at least 
three oppositions that are similar in givenness versus newness, but all of which 
will require separate recognition. The first usage is the designation of partici- 
pants contextually as we have done above. The second usage derives from the 
complex of information that the addressee is assumed not to know. When this 
is conveyed to the addressee, it constitutes the Rheme of the Theme-Rheme 
opposition. Failure to differentiate between these two aspects has resulted in 
confusion; for example, in a discussion of contrastiveness Chafe (1974:118) 
remarks, "One would like to make the generalization that only items conveying 
given information can be pronominalized," but then he notes that in sentences 
like 
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(9) HE killed Cock Robin 
with contrastive stress on the pronoun, hgappears toconvey new information 
as well. It then becomes necessary to qualify the generaIization to state that 
pronouns are possible with items of given information or with simultaneous 
new and contrastive information. One wonders what would happen to 
non-contrastive sentences like 
(10) He did it 
containing only pronouns. Either there is no "new" at all-which violates 
Clark and Haviland's (1977: 15) claim that all assertions contain "given-new" 
(read "Theme-Rheme") distinctions-or Chafe's qualification fails again. 
Clark and Haviland (1 977: 12- 13) themselves encounter a similar difficulty 
with definite articles in cleft sentences, as in (1 1): 
(1 1) It was the judge who took the bribe. 
The initial portion of such sentences (It was the judge. . .) is the Rheme (they 
note that the judge involves "identification"), but like Chafe they fail to 
distinguish the two parameters of Given-New versus Theme-Rheme and 
cannot establish the correct generalization, continuing to "write given and 
new in the less precise form with the understanding that it can be made 
precise." Recognition that contrastiveness in (9) and identification in (I I) are 
varieties of Rheme, a dimension distinct from Given-New in our sense, resolves 
both problems. We consider the "inconsistencies" Chafe and Clark and 
Haviland have noted to be evidence for this distinction. The Theme-Rheme 
opposition clearly labels a collection of phenomena, e.g., the cleft usage in (8) 
and (I I ) ,  the relational Rheme of Given participants and event in (lo), etc., that 
all relate to discourse states. The third sense of givenness-newness is illustrated 
by the newness implied in such utterances as I'm going to tellyou what 'glumpf 
is now. This last is not a discourse phenomenon and will not concern us here.4 
We turn now to how the range of Given-Recoverable-New phenomena 
may be interrelated and best approached. It is usual to assign or  describe the 
tactics of the different strata in terms of a scope, e.g., the phonological word 
of phonotactics as opposed to the morphological word of morphotactics; and 
the scope of the semotactics is the "proposition" (Lockwood 1972:166). If 
this is the correct way of conceiving the problem, then several conclusions 
appear to follow. First, there will be conditioned choices within the semotactics, 
i.e., ordered oRs, and the conditioning factor will lie outside the proposition, 
i.e., outside the semotactics. A simple example is the choice between pronoun 
or noun (semologically, Index or Name, respectively. See Copeland and 
Davis Ms.); the selection of one or the other is not free. In the park context 
above, the presence of squirrel a s  against he is not random. The required 
selection implies a distinct "something" to which propositions are related so 
that the former may effect choices within the latter. Second, the patterning of 
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language does not cease with propositions. A higher pattern of broaderscope 
exists. This is now a truism within linguistics (Hjelmslev 1961; Pike 1967). 
That something more inclusive is required has also been argued within the 
stratificational approach (Bennett 1968; Lockwood 1972), and it has often 
been labeled gnostology. 
Gnostology has been invoked t o  describe two kinds of phenomena. The 
first description is that found in the work of Lamb (1970 and Ms.), in which 
gnostology recapitulates one aspect of cognitive anthropological studies: the 
taxonomic hierarchy. Lamb (1970:220) illustrates, for example, how one's 
knowledge of the animal kingdom may be represented by means of a stratifi- 
cational arrangement of unordered ANDs and ORs. The second gnostological 
function is one suggested by Lockwood (1972: 1 lo), which incorporates a 
description of a "text" as a series of elements (ultimately utterances) sequenced 
by an ordered AND. We shall propose a way of reconciling these two kinds of 
gnostological information in a useful way. 
We comment first on the taxonomy. The growth ofcognitive anthropology 
(as represented in Tyler [1969]) was in part the result of linguists'failure to 
acknowledge that language was more than form, that it conveyed meaning. 
Anthropological linguists filled that vacuum, developing sophisticated 
formal ways of dealing with lexical domains. The primary results were two. 
Some form of a taxonomy was purported to  describe a person's knowledge 
that X is a Y; Y is a Z, etc. Such chains of statements underlie the complex 
schemata that Lamb represents within gnostology. The second result was the 
employment of the matrix to represent a person's claim that While Pmay not 
be a Q nor an R, it sharespropertiesof both. The parameters of the matrix are 
then defined by what P shares with Q and R and what it is that distinguishes 
them. Recent work suggests that both the taxonomic hierarchy and the 
matrix may make incorrect claims. There are indications that the elaborate 
taxonomies constructed by the anthropologist/linguist are not necessarily 
matched by the native informant. Randall (1976) shows that the transitivity 
one would expect from such a representation is not always present; I fXis  a Y 
and Y is a Z, X is not necessarily a 2. Others (e.g., Berlin I972:59-65) have 
shown a continuous phenomenon not predicted by the taxonomic hierarchy 
alone: I f  both A is a C and B is a C, sometimes A may be more a C than B is. 
Finally Kintsch (1974) has argued that what is called "semantic" memory (as 
opposed to  "episodic"), that is, the apparent, contextless knowledge under- 
lying such statements as Robins are birds, is predicational in nature. The gist 
of this is that taxonomies exist as the anthropologist's/Iinguist's summation 
of a conversation with a n  informant. The irreducible element underlying this 
appears again to be something like a predication. 
The use of components or  features that characterize the matrix-knowledge 
of cognitive anthropology has also been popular within certain linguistic 
approaches (Katz and Fodor 1963; Dillon 1977). This, however, is unneces- 
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sary, committing one t o  pursuit of semantic features analogous to phonetic] 
phonologica~ ones and failing, finally, to deal adequately with certain semantic 
problems, e.g., the "hedges" of Lakoff (1972). Others have noticed that the neat 
oppositions expected in matrices are often absent, with distinctions within a 
semantic domain being indicated uneconomically by many and varied criteria 
(Bulmer 1970). This reflects the observation that each occurrence of a word in 
novel semantic contexts isolates new features. Semantic multidimensionality of 
terms is also a conclusion of psychological study (e.g., Mandler 1975b:510-511). 
Kintsch (1974) and Mandler (1975b:510) suggest that it is sufficient to define 
semantic units by their interrelationships to other semantic units. Mandler goes 
on to adopt the familiar position of Lamb (taken from de Saussure and 
Hjelmslev): that relationships, not items or entities, are primary. 
Now, using stratificational notation we may begin by representing in figure I 
the knowledge that enables the utterance Robins are birds. This piece of 
gnostology shows one way of representing information that is equivalent to  
semantic (Kintsch 1974), long term (Baddeley 1976: 100ff. et passim; Craik 
and Lockhart 1972:671-673), secondary (William James, cited in Norman 
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[1969]) or deep memory (Chafe 1973). This contextless memory is the 
"knowledge" that is the subject of cognitive anthropological study. The basic 
unit of that representation is the nection (Lamb Ms.). The lines into the 
upward A N D  portion characterize the nection, and the lines leadingout of the 
nection through the downward A N D  lead to other nections to characterize 
them. As many "features" define a nection as there are lines into its upward 
AND. These characterizing lines also capture the predicationaI property 
Kintsch has attributed to semantic memory. 
One property of this notation that requires justification and explanation is 
the presence of the A N D  relation on both the upward and downward portions 
of the nection. We have several reasons for this. First, intuitively, it seems that 
all knowledge is simultaneousIy and continuously present. It is the manipula- 
tion and accession of this knowledge that shows selection or primacy. Second, 
study of what is commonly called attention has shown that whilesucha thing 
seems to exist and while it seems to have the effect of selecting, it is also true 
that non-attended, automatic stimuli are also recorded; they are not denied 
entry and filtered out. The activation of one portion of gnostology does not 
preclude the activation of any other portion. The relative presence of these 
non-attended stimuli (measured in terms of differential times in the perfor- 
mance of certain tasks, e.g., naming) varies as the stimulus's "relationship to 
the attended information" (Posner and Snyder 1975:61). Posner and Snyder 
discuss an array of experiments on automatic processing that is compatible 
with the proposal we are making here. This also allows Neisser's (1976) 
experiments with dual tasks, e.g., reading while transcribing an aurally pre- 
sented list of unrelated words. There appears to be no "either-or" presence of 
such knowledge; it is all present all the time. Rather, it is or it is not accessed. The 
assertion of constant presence of knowledge (as equivalent to gnostological 
structure) leaves a problem; namely, one does not talk of all things, nor is one 
aware of all things simultaneously. Hence, the OR portion of each nection in 
figure 1. These are intended to convey the possibility of selective accession, 
e.g., recall, while not denying the presence of the remaining external lines of 
the nection. (The AND-OR node is taken from Reich [1968].) Some selective 
mechanism is now required to specify the utilization and nonce organization 
of that knowledge. 
Chafe (1973 and 1974) has made some interesting remarks on this general 
topic. He has proposed a distinction between surface, shallow, and deep 
memory on the basis of certain linguistic usage, referring to the employment 
of temporal adverbs in these sentences (Chafe 1973:263): 
(12) (a) Steve fell into the swimming pool 
(b) Steve fell into the swimming pool yesterday 
(c) Last Christmas Steve fell into the swimming pool. 
It is claimed that (12a), with no adverb of time, is appropriate only when the 
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~ccurrence of which it informs the addressee is in the consciousness or "very 
close to the surface of consciousness"(Chafe 1973:265). The speaker is either 
with the occurrence or has retained it in his consciousness from 
the time he learned of it. Sentence (l2b) is appropriate to the memory context 
of (12a) but also to what Chafe terms shallow memory. As he characterizes it, 
shallow memory seems to be the same memory Tulving (1972) terms "episodic." 
That is, a person (by either Chafe's or Tulving's description) can still recall "the 
sequence of events in an effortless way7'(Chafe 1973:368), or he can recall "auto- 
biographical events. . . in terms of their perceptible dimensions or attributes and 
in terms of their temporal-spatial relations to other such events" (Tulving 
1972:387). Episodic memory is opposed to semantic memory by the "differential 
nature of stored information," "denotative reference of input events,""re- 
trieval," and "susceptibility to interference and erasure" (Tulving 1972:402). 
Semantic memory seems to be what Chafe intends with his deep memory, and 
it is retrieval from this type that Chafe sees as appropriate to the utterance of 
(12c). The possible correlations are given in (13): 
(1 3) Surface Memory Shallow Memory Deep Memory 
(12a) or (12b) or (12c) (12b) or (12c) ( 1 2 ~ )  
Additional evidence, e.g., the non-generic perfect, is adduced for the distinction 
of surface memory from some non-surface type. 
The surface-shallow-deep distinction is potentially useful in determining the 
conduct of discourse. "Potential" because Chafe does not distinguish the three 
using the dyad of speaker-addressee, but with focus on what may preoccupy 
the speaker. (The distinction of episodic and semantic is also made without 
regard to its function within a social-cultural context.) The addressee, and hence 
discourse, is omitted. The discourse usage that we have called Recoverable 
provides a similar surface-like versus shallow-like distinction. Returning to the 
park context of sentence (I), let us assume the squirrel successfully crosses the 
street and our conversation flows on to other matters; then as we leave the park 
some time later, the speaker looks around and notices the same squirrel now 
attempting to go back across the street. His utterance is (14): 
(14) Look! The squirrel is crossing the street. 
Now, use of a in (14) indicating that the addressee should treat squirrel as a 
completely New participant is inappropriate; it simply says the wrong thing. 
Similarly, replacing the named participant with he or it may fail in that the 
addressee is now unable to determine who the he is. In Grice's f 1975) terms, 
we would have failed t o  observe the maxim ofquantity and to provide enough 
data to recall or identify what the information concerns. If, however, the 
squirrel were to remain in our-to use Chafe's term-surface memory, then 
an utterance like 
(15) Look! He's crossing the street 
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is acceptable. Sentence (14) remains acceptable as well. Thus, analogous to 
(13)-defined independently of discourse context-we may construct (16): 
(16) I I I 111 
the or he the a 
The question arises whether (13) and (1 6) are equivalent, and the answer is 
"Not quite." Chafe's illustrative sentences are uttered "out of the blueW(Chafe 
1973:264), whereas ours are determined contextually. Chafe's sentences point 
more to  a speaker-attitudinal distinction of surface-shallow-deep, whereas 
the three-way distinction of (16) is neutral in this respect; neutral as long as 
the boundaries between the distinctions of (16) are close enough for speaker 
and addressee in both principle and usage. We must a11 know people who 
"misuse" the 11-the versus the III-a distinction and extend the 11-the to in- 
appropriate places referring to  participants no longer within the consciousness 
of the addressee and identifiable only from a previous conversation. The fact of 
discourse implies shared experience and hence an episodic memory that is alike 
for both speaker and addressee (allowing, of course, for different points of view 
and so forth). Thus, I1 in (16) is the portion of the speaker's and addressee's 
individual episodic memories that is held in common; 111 will then include what- 
ever portion of episodic memory of the interlocutors does not arise from shared 
discourse experience and also what Chafe labels as deep memory (what Tulving 
discusses as semantic memory). The term "misuse" means only that in specific 
instances the speaker has misjudged his addressee's shared episodic memory, 
and the addressee is incapable of identifying the particular participant indicated 
by the. Within English (and perhaps all languages), the boundary between I1 
and I11 is not determinable with absolute temporal limits, nor, probably, is it 
quantifiable at all, even in something like experiential time. The boundary 
between I1 and I11 is recognizable only in contextual terms and appears to be 
one characterized by a very specific usage of Grice's (1975:45) maxim of 
quantity: "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
purposes of the exchange)." 
The first discourse-determined particularization of the gnostological 
structure (as outlined in figure 1) is then determined by combining a psycho- 
logical aspect-episodic memory-with a cultural one. This specifies a type 
or usage of memory, i.e., recall, that would not necessarily be the subject of a 
purely psychologically oriented study. Where distinctions are made between 
types of memory (Tulving [1972:382] notes reference to approximately fifty 
"categories of memory'?, the usual one is that between secondary and primary 
(Norman 1969:90-91), also apparently called long-term and short-term, respec- 
tively (Baddeley 1976). A third "type" is the episodic memory of Tulving, which 
must be somehow intercalated with secondary/long-term (or semantic) 
memory and primary/short-term memory. We ignore here sensory memory 
as not relevant to  our immediate purpose. The binary opposition of I1 and I11 
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that we have identified is not in itself sufficient to constrain figure 1 and 
determine all the necessary discourse contexts. As indicated in (16), another, 
more immediate distinction is required to account for I versus 11. 
We conclude above that a culturally relevant usage of memory was helpful 
in identifying the distinction between I1 and 111; and we might approach the 1-11 
distinction in an analogous way. We shall base this opposition on an adaptation 
of consciousness. In psychological discussion, consciousness is quite often used 
synonymously with attention on grounds that each is a "limited capacity 
mechanism" (Mandler 1975a:232-233); and for the same reason consciousness 
is also "closely related with" primary memory (Baddeley 1976: 165). 
One aspect of the concern with consciousness/attention is represented by 
studies of the act of sensory perception. The active nature of sensory perception 
and learning (and including language decoding, e.g., Bransford and McCarrell 
[ I  9741) is generally accepted (Baddeley 1976: 13). The modeling of this process 
(see Neisser 1976) is based on schemata, a notion that has not, apparently, 
been made very precise (Neisser 1976:51-78 and Craik 1979:65). A schema 
appears to be a structural principle; it is "not a center in the brain" but an 
"active array of physiological structures and processes" (Neisser 1976:54). As 
a principle of nonce organization that forms long-term memory/ knowledge, 
schemata are one aspect of consciousness. Neisser (1976:62) further suggests 
that schemata function in memory. (Memory studies are in fact the source of 
this notion in psychology. See Baddeley [1976: 13-15].) As active organization 
of memory/knowledge, they constitute consciousness/attention as percep- 
tion, and traces of their presence remain in the now modified-by-their-action 
long-term memory / knowledge as additional (and episodic) memory. "Thus 
schemata not only enable us to  perceive present events but also to store 
information about past ones" (Neisser 1976:62; see also Craik and Lockhart 
1972:671). 
Consciousness may be hypothesized to be a possible state of the long-term 
memory / knowledge (Mandler 1975a:238). Consciousness is long-term 
memory/ knowledge made active, and to  have retrieved or recalled something 
is to have made an existing structure conscious. One mmight expect the possible 
sensory inputs to  define differently structured states (see, e.g., Atkinson and 
Wescourt 1975:489); a visual schema may not be the same as an auditory one, 
yet they may nevertheless operate upon and activate the same portion of long- 
term memory/knowledge. Posner and Snyder (1975:66) note items that 
"share the same pathway"; and Piaget (1963: 121) writes, "When an object can 
be simultaneously grasped and sucked or grasped, looked at and sucked, it 
becomes externalized in relation to the subject quite differently than if it could 
only be grasped." Coordination of schemata occurs, and the pivot of that 
coordination is the long-term memory/knowledge. 
Many studies of consciousness/attention are concerned with its selective 
property as  measured by various tasks. Such experiments are frequently 
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atypical in various ways. Miller's (1956) famous paper on seven, plus or minus 
two, reflects this, in that it is based on conclusions drawn from completely 
random occurrences of items and unlikely chores of discrimination. Miller 
quantifies his measurements by bits of information that constitute "equally 
likery alternatives" (1956:83) so that "7+-2" will have some meaning, and he 
expects some confusion when the "channel capacity" is reached (1956:82). 
Such studies are analogous to a study of the ability to discriminate phonetic 
gradations in the voicing of dental stops. One may learn something of the 
possibilities of auditory discrimination, and the data may be replicable; but 
when we ask what we havelearned about language from this, theanswer must 
obviously be that we have gained very little. Specifically, it is a question of 
whether such data reflect normal functioning; and if so, how the connection 
between the atypical experimental context and the typical, non-experimental 
one is to be made.' (See Baddeley [1976, Chapter 1 etpassim] for discussion, 
and Neisser [1976:33ff.] for a statement of this concern with respect to "eco- 
logical validity.") Kintsch (1975) attempts to counter this negative interpreta- 
tion of atypical experiments. 
One implication of this may be that there is no psychology that is culture- 
free, much of a person's cognitive capacity being formed by the relevant tasks 
of his culture. There may be parameters analogous to those of phonetics, e.g., 
absolute channel capacity (Miller I956), that fix the bounds of the structure; 
but any meaningful study of the structures themselves (recall, perception, 
attention, and so forth) will require recognition that different cultures will 
have organized the biological possibilities in different ways. "The conditions 
of personal and socia1 development determine what can and cannot be 
represented in consciousness. . . . different individuals, groups, and cultures 
will have different conscious contentsm(Mandler I975a:238). Briefly, it would 
be helpful to recognize here the equivalent of the etic/emic distinction of 
linguistics in all cognitive work. The argument is not that the first should be 
ignored-the atypical experiment has its place-but that the difference be 
recognized, and both-and their interrelationship-should receive equal 
attention. There exists already an enormous bibliography with this general 
focus (see Ember [1977] and Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition 
[1979] for reviews). Nor is the concern a new one; the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 
is one early manifestation of this emphasis (see, e.g., Brown and Lenneberg 
1954). 
Mandler (1975b:513) uses consciousness to cover a "wide variety of mental 
and cognitive functions," and in this spirit it does not seem unreasonable to 
postulate an additional schema, the semotactics, to define a further way that 
perception-the registration of information-is accomplished and consciousness/ 
attention organized. In this way the semotactics defines an additional mode of 
consciousness, and from this perspective long-term memory/ knowledge (and, 
now, also gnostological structure) is not purely linguistic. Memory/ knowledge/ 
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gnostological structure is seen to mediate informational inputs in that it may be 
active from multiple sources of external stimdi. This allows, or even 
requires, the observation that non-verbal, as well as verbal, contexts function in 
discourse. Compare the context of (I) above. Such mediation may serve then as 
an explanation of experimental results in which sensory perception is improved 
when subjects are instructed prior to the presentation (Miller 1956:89). It 
provides a way of understanding Piaget's (1963) suggestion that intelligence, 
i.e., long-term memory/ knowledge/gnostological structure, develops from 
certain sensorimotor performances, e.g., sucking and grasping. This allows 
language to develop upon the same base that is ontogenetically developed from 
a non-language consciousness. Phylogenetically, language may be seen as 
growing on the base of memory/knowledge present through the action of other, 
non-language sensory schemata, a memory/ knowledge further specified and 
elaborated through the language schema of possible proposition into a gnosto- 
logical structure of the type outlined in figure I .  (The possibility of a continuum 
across non-human species in the development of consciousness is discussed in 
Griffin [1976].) 
Our original interest in consciousness was to identify some principle that 
might serve as an immediate constraint on gnostology and create the necessary 
context for discourse. In achieving this end we have taken the notion of 
consciousness/attention, observed the schema characteristics attributed to it, 
and then rendered it functional within language by identifying the semotactics 
-possible proposition-as one manifestation. We return now to consideration 
of its limiting function, and there are two aspects that are of primary concern: a 
capacity limit and a temporal one. 
The capacity is identified as that limit to the number of items retained by 
short-term memory, either from immediate perception or recalI from long- 
term memory/ knowledge/gnostology; and that limit appears to hover about 
five (Mandler 1975b:501), i.e., Miller's seven, minus two. Mandler (1  975b:5 10) 
hypothesizes that the limit results from the organization of long-term memory/ 
knowledge/gnostology rather than a limit on the process of its activization. 
Craik and Lockhart (1972:672) identify it as a "limit on processing." The source 
of this limit is indeed interesting, but of more immediate concern is the capacity 
of consciousness/attention to comprehend, to render active, a relatively small 
number of items. Does this accord with the notion that semotactics may 
function as a schema of consciousness? The two appear to be not so disparate 
if we consider the possible elements of a semotactic proposition, the schema 
that, projected upon long-term memory/knowledge/gnostology, determines 
one mode of consciousness. Fillmore (1971:42) suggests that a proposition 
may universally consist of an event plus one or more of approximately eight 
participant roles. These, as always, are accompanied by the caveat of possible 
change. The total number of items that are then predicted as potentially 
included in consciousness is nine; but this is the maximum. Normal utterances 
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-perceptions of the wor ld -do  not include all this possible information. And 
some languages seem to deny even the possibility. In Bella Coola, for example, 
sentences that include Agent, Patient, Goal, and Instrument plus an event lie 
about at the upper boundary. Inclusion of Time and/or Place as well elicits 
headshakes and the comment that "You can't say that." But why? Although the 
grammar/lexology appears perfectly all right, such linguists' sentences are 
rejected, and this may in part explain why. We leave open the question of how 
such sentences in English may elude the constraint (literacy?). In any case, in 
practice or  performance the limit suggested by Mandler and Miller does not 
seem very far off. 
One query to this might be "Can we hold conversations only on topics of 
approximately five distinctions?" The answer is obviously "No"; we can greatly 
exceed that. The psychological construct that permits us to overcome that 
limitation is the principle of chunking. Miller (1956) has shown that the ability 
to recall can overcome the 7k2 limit by recoding data exceeding the limit into 
fewer units that will then fall within the requisite constraints. It is then possible 
to recover, i.e., recall, terms "embedded" within the larger chunked pieces 
according to some general principle. It is of course tempting to see in this the 
source of linguistic embedding, e.g., complement sentences functioning in some 
role, complex noun phrases with relative clauses, etc. They would certainly seem 
to be closely related, although it is not a priori true that they must be. 
All in all then, the capacity constraint does not appear to eliminate the 
semotactics-representation of possible happening-as a mode of conscious- 
ness, but rather to lend it some support,6 The second constraint that is some- 
times attributed to consciousness/attenrion is a temporal one. Mandler 
(1975a:237) characterizes consciousness as the "psychological present" and 
suggests that it is itself none of the memory types, that memory is the wrong 
characterization of consciousness: "memory mechanisms and the contents of 
consciousness are two very distinct kinds of mental events" (1976a:237). 
Consciousness is not a store of knowledge; it is a state of knowledge (see also 
Mandler 1975b:501). Still, something that is conscious does not remain 
forever so; it may be displaced. But if it is not displaced, what keeps it there; 
and if that act of maintenance is not performed, how long does it remain? The 
psychological maintenance mechanism is called rehearsal (Baddeley 1976: 152 
et passim; Mandler 1975b:512-513); and if it is not performed, items disappear 
from the conscious state (as calculated by the atypical task of trying to recall a 
random list when distracted from rehearsal by the performance of a second 
attention-occupying task) in approximately twenty to thirty seconds (Baddeley 
1976: 101). 
Above, we approached the distinction of 1-11 in (16) from the appropriateness 
of anaphoric pronoun use. In determining the 11-111 boundary, it appeared that 
absolute time was not relevant, and it is not clear that the passage of time is here 
a relevant parameter of usage for such pronouns. The conduct of coherent 
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conversation must certainIy function in the manner of rehearsal, serving to 
maintain certain particulars in consciousness, thus enabling one to refer to 
them via pronouns. The presence of anaphoric pronouns cannot be determined 
by any one principle as, for example, in Langacker (1969). One aspect of their 
use is the requisite consciousness of their referent and that itself has further 
aspects beyond the contextual, discourse one. There may exist constraints on 
pronominal usage that assure proper identifiability, thus avoiding ambiguity 
(see Davis and Saunders Ms.). Languages may develop differing resources to 
guarantee identifiability: for example, the switch reference of Yuman, the 
obviative of Algonkian, or the middle voice of Salishan, wherein the ambiguity 
of the English He tied his shoes is not possible. Some languages such as English 
simply exist with the ambiguity, but we would assume that all Ianguages in 
some way recognize the discourse constraint of consciousness on anaphoric 
pronouns. In no language can a normal conversation begin with the equivalent 
of He did it. In any case, consciousness of the participant-referent is a 
requisite for pronominal usage, and consciousness can be maintained via the 
linguistic rehearsal mechanism of simple mention. If this is true, then there 
can be no absolute time content in I to separate it from 11; time is completely 
contingent. 
But what if the rehearsal-mention is absent? Or if the conversation mentions 
some particular once and then moves on from that individual, is there then a 
temporal boundary? Such questions can be reliably answered only from 
empirical observations. Thought experiments may reveal that in such circum- 
stances it quickly becomes difficult to return to that particular via pronominal 
usage, and this time may accord with the relatively short span of short-term 
memory. The fact of replacement of items in consciousness by others should 
easily produce instances in which identifying a referent by anaphoric pronoun 
is impossible well within the twenty-to-thirty-second time limit. 
It is clear that our usage of consciousness is not precisely the same as the 
purely psychological term, nor is it meant to be, Discourse-relevant conscious- 
ness cannot be the abrupt, pointillistically active state, but must be augmented 
to allow for the passage of arbitrary amounts of time, and it is rehearsal by 
mention that provides this leeway. Because rehearsal does not involve recall, but 
maintenance, this adapted consciousness, like Mandler's, is not a memory. The 
conscious state, formed by sensory schemata including the semotactics, but 
unmaintained by rehearsal-mention, requires to be distinguished from what we 
now call simply "consciousness"; and for this aspect we adopt Mandler's 
(1 975a:237) term "focal attention." 
"Memory" is ambiguous, referring both to what is in it (referred to as the 
store: Baddeley 1976:103; Craik and Lockhart 1972:672) and also t o  the 
process of recall (referred to as retrieval or memory, e.g., short-term memory). 
Here, we go against the terminological grain of psychology and call the first 
"memory" or, redundantly, "memory store," and the second either "recall" or 
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"retrieval." We have suggested that memory (also knowledge or gnostolog 
structure) may very generally be represented as in figure I.' Such an approa 
makes it difficult to  distinguish between types of memory (or stores) a 
indeed one active, though not unchallenged, view among psychologists i 
there is but one such representation; i.e,, one memory store (Craik and Loc 
1972). Differences in capacity and time in recall and possible coding or re 
sentation in memory result from processing; i.e., how information is acqui 
Differentials in resulting presence of information in the memory and thus 1 
recall are the artifacts of how, or to what degree, different sensory schemata a 
employed in gathering the information. This is Craik and Lockhart's "level 
processing." Our use of the opposition of episodic memory to a kind of mem 
distinct from that is not intended to imply a second memory, but to 
addition to that single memory store-an addition that is distinguishable b 
content from the matrix memory into which it is placed. 
In concluding our presentation, we consider how the structure of figure 
may function within this framework. We base our discussion on figure 2, 
possible portion of gnostologica1 structure, and an example sentence discusse 
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by Chafe (1974:125). Consider sentence (17) uttered at some point in a con- 
versation: 
(17) Yesterday I had my class interrupted by a bulldog. 
Assuming that bulldogs have not been previously mentioned in the discourse, 
(17) may in part be seen as an instruction by the speaker to the addressee to 
imake conscious" the nection BULLDOG and to construct a nonce and unique, 
nection Bulldog characterized by the former; thus the presence of 
Bulldog connected to   BULLDOG.^ The Bulldog nection represents a New 
when it is introduced. Discourse-modified memory is indicated 
arbitrarily by broken lines, and we exclude from this immediate example the 
broken line leading to "ugly." If the utterance following (17) is within the bounds 
of temporally variable consciousness, that same particular may be referred to 
again and identified pronominally: 
(18) I chased him out. 
This Bulldog, once introduced, is a Given participant. Should, however, the 
conversation move from (1 7) to the content of the lecture, the nection will not be 
maintained in consciousness through rehearsal-mention, but will remain in the 
gnostoIogica1 structure as part of the memory store of that discourse; i.e., in 11. 
After completing a summary of the lecture, utterance (19), not (18), is appro- 
priate: 
(19) I chased the bulldog out. 
Notice that it would also be appropriate to say (20) or (21): 
(20) I chased the dog out 
(21) I chased the animal out. 
This raises the question of why (17) was phrased with BULLDOG in the first place 
rather than some other. Such choices are not completely free and are them- 
selves frequently subject t o  the discourse context (see Brown 1958; and more 
recently Cruse 1977 and Nelson 1977). So long as there has been no mention 
in the conversation of other dogs, in the case of (20), or other animals, in the 
case of (21), so that (20) and (21), respectively, might fail to identify the one 
intended, either is appropriate; and the choice itself may convey information 
-not discourse or  propositional information, but information of the speaker's 
attitude; i.e., modal in fo rmat i~n .~  The correct identifications derive from the 
presence of Bulldog in the realm of I1 and require the addressee to use his long- 
term memory knowledge of I11 to identify Bulldog as the particular intended. In 
(20), for example, DOG, now conscious by virtue of the utterance of (20) and 
because it characterizes BULLDOG and by implication Bulldog as well, may 
render Bulldog conscious. This inference is an example of what Clark and 
Haviland (1977) have called "computability." 
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We turn now to  a second aspect of figure 2, namely, the nection BULLDOG 
and the broken line labeled "ugly." For  the discussion here we assume initially 
that the BuIIdog nection is absent. Suppose again that at some point in the 
conversation sentence (23) were uttered: 
(23) The bulldog is ugly 
and that the Generic meaning is intended. This will again be interpreted as an 
instruction to make a nection active, here BULLDOG, but not any nections that it 
may in turn characterize. The Rheme information to  be added (. . . is ugly) is 
indicated by the broken line above. Because that nection is now conscious, 
utterances like (24) are possible: 
(24) I saw a nice one yesterday. 
Sentence (24) creates a particular nection below the BULLDOG one, and because 
the latter is conscious, a pronominal identification is possible; but also 
because that particular nection was not present prior to (24), it also partakes 
of the New property. This is the Some introduced in (7) and (8). In the sentence 
sequence (23)-(24), the first can be replaced by (25) 
(25) I'm gonna buy John's bulldog 
to give the ordered pair (25)-(24). These sentence pairs are the basis of two 
conclusions, Let us assume first that (25) appears at a point in the conversation 
at which John?  bulldog is not conscious-whether Recoverable or New is 
immaterial here. Either sentence (25) renders conscious a present, particular 
nection (analogous to Bulldog in figure 2) if Recoverable, o r  causes the 
construction of a particular nection under BULLDOG with a characterizing 
line John S (analogous to disrupted class in figure 2) if New. A matter passed 
over in formulating the encoding of bulldog in (17) was whether the construc- 
tion of a nonce, particular nection implies that the nection that characterizes 
it (i.e., BULLDOGin the BULLDOG-Bulldogrelationship) is also, by that fact, to 
be considered conscious. The sequence (25)-(24) indicates that it is; the 
construction of a New nection or making conscious a Recoverable one implies 
the characterizing nection is to be conscious as well. That is the first point. The 
reason for this conclusion is the second. If we accept that both the particular 
nection and the nection characterizing it are conscious, then the characteriza- 
tion of the Some category is relatively easily made, although the discourse 
category itself is complex. A Some discourse category occurs in, or is appropri- 
ate to, a context in which a particular nection is constructed and characterized 
by a nection that is already conscious. That is the second point. Sentence (25) 
constructs a nonce, particular nection characterized by BULLDOG, and the 
consciousness of the latter enables the construction of a second nonce, 
particular nection that may be referred to initially with a pronoun; i.e., one of 
(24). Both sentence pairs, (23)-(24) and (25)-(24), with one in the second 
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member, have the same explanation; the one is a Some. Because Some occurs 
in this constrained context it appears to partake both of Givenness and 
Newness. Further exemplification and justification of this category appears 
in Copeland and Davis (Ms.), wherein the characterizing nection is termed the 
sernological Domain, and the characterized, the semological Particular. This 
discussion is summarized in table 1. Generic is now revealed to be not a dis- 
course category in the way Given-Recoverable-New-Some are; if it has discourse 
constraints, they appear not to be formulated in terms of discourse-relevant 
adaptations of consciousness and memory. 
We have not detailed in a very formal way how these suggestions may be 
implemented within the notation of cognitive linguistics, and clearly the relation 
of semology to both gnostology and lexology becomes in this view much more 
problematic than before. One formal suggestion may be to use Johannesson's 
(1976:132-133) diamond node on the internal line of a nection to express the 
interrelationship of gnostology and semology. The notion of Theme-Rheme 
that we distinguished from Given-New has its separate place within this frame: 
the instruction to add lines between nections in the gnostology. It is then in part 
the function of semotactics to project that connectioh. We would expect this 
view to provide a useful framework for discussion of the principles of cohesion 
(Halliday and Hasan 1976) or relevancy (Grice 1975). Other phenomena termed 
discourse ("narrative" structure and so forth; see note 3) may also be amenable 
to interpretation as schemata, perhaps analogous to those that have been 
labeled cognitive maps (Neisser 1976: 108- 127). In short, the approach seems 
productive. 
Discourse is not static; both discourse and consciousness flow. "The normal 
form is the flow" (Mandler 1975a:249), and the principles of that flow are 
relevancy and Theme-Rheme. Discourse may then be restated as the coordina- 
tion of multiple, inter-personal conscious flows, and we would expect then that 
the concerns of cognitive psychology, linguistics, and anthropology will be 
congruent, as we have attempted to show. 
TABLE 1 
Characterized 
Necti on 
Conscious 
Conscious Given 
Not Conscious 
Some 
Not Conscious Does not New or Recoverable 
occur 
RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
NOTES 
1. Such rapprochement is a generally accepted desideratum. Lamb (1971) has rechristened 
his approach to language "cognitive linguistics"; Chomsky (1968) has viewed linguistics as  a 
subfield of cognitive psychology; and psychologists (e.g., Clark and Haviland 1974) have con- 
curred. This consensus is, however, fragmented in pursuit of the goal. Some (e.g., Derwing and 
Baker 1978) have begun the melding of the experimental paradigm of psychology to a focus on 
language with the idea of discovering what language is, rather than justifying a preconceived 
theory, e.g., the search for psychological data to justify syntactic constructs (see Fodor, Bever, 
and Garrett 1974). 
2. In German sentences containing two discontinuous verbal components, the Satzfeld 1s 
that position between them: the blank in the formula SV-v, e.g., Er hot mein Buch einetn 
Dummkopf gegeben. 
3. Discourse is narrowly taken here as one aspect of face-to-face interaction (Goffman 1963) 
and not written language, literature, nor more formal oral structures that have been studied else- 
where (e.g., Lord [I9641 and Propp [1968]. See Longacre [I9791 for a review of discourse, 
primarily "narrative," st&s from the tagmemic perspective). Theseundoubtedly employ many 
of the structures of face-to-face discourse, but in their own defining manner. See also Tyler (1978). 
4. The Theme-Rheme distinction extends beyond the relatively narrow discourse focus of this 
paper and appears in other aspects of usage, such as the sociolinguistic. In a classic paper on pro- 
nominal choice, Brown and Gilman (1960) have shown that choice of a second person pronoun 
(their T and V forms) may signal sociolinguistic, Rheme-like information. 
5. Miller (1956:89) notes one example of the klnd of relevance we intend in his discussion of 
discriminations where multiple dimensions are present. The number of distinctive features ("about 
eight or ten dimensions") within the phonological systems and the number of discriminable 
phonemes they enable provide "qulte a different picture of speech perception than we might other- 
wise obtain from our studies . . . of the ear's ability to discriminate relative differences among pure 
tones." Piaget's naturalistic observations of his children are a consistent exception to the complaint 
of atypicality, as is F. C. Bartlett's work on memory (Baddeley 1976:9-15). 
6. Certainly there is no logical reason that the universe should be perceived and understood 
with just the small number of distinctions that appear in fact to occur. Why not understand and talk 
about a car accident uslng thirty parameters? To reply 'That's nonsense" IS to reiterate simply that 
we do not; it does not answer the question "Why not?" 
7. The general shape of figure 1 (and figure 2 below) is certainly not precise enough, but this 
problem goes far beyond the immediate concern of thls paper. The structure of long-term memory/ 
knowledge IS a frequent topic within psychology. The model we present here has certain properties 
in common with that outlined In Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman (1972). 
8. The instruction format seems to correspond to the psychological process of "encoding," a 
terminology that is approximately the reverse of the use of "encoding : decoding" withln Ilnguistics. 
See Tulving (1972:397-399). This Interpretation of New as the construction of a nection is simiIar to 
a vlew discussed in Craik (1979:87). Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman (1972) appear to recognize a 
similar distinction with their primary (the characterizing) and secondary (the characterized, nonce) 
nodes. Notice also that New and Recoverable are simllar, differing only in that New contains 
instructions to construct a conscious nection, not previously present, whereas Recoverable contains 
instructions to render conscious a nection already present. The former is comparable to (sensory) 
comprehension/recognition and the latter to retrieval/recall. The implication is that the two 
processes are closely related, a conclusion noted in Craik (197994). 
9. Cruse's (1977) discussion proceeds In terms of inherently versus contextually neutral 
specificity and marked versus unmarked (neutral). The marked may correspond to our "modal" 
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~nformation, the contextual frame is clearly our discourse context. It is tempting to see In Cruse's 
inherent, i.e., context free, specificity a reflection of Berlin, Breedlove. and Raven's (1973) "generic" 
level in their discussion of universal properbes of taxonomic structures. 
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